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Introduction
During the 1990s, when ‘globalisation’ first appeared in 
both academic and policy thinking, it became fashionable 
to discuss the ‘death of distance’ in international relations. 
The proliferation of modern transportation and communica-
tions technologies along with the spread of industries and 
the liberalisation of trade have all had a significant impact 
on the entire world and the effects of the various types of 
globalisation are increasingly visible including in the Arctic. 
The suggestion that the world was becoming ‘flat’ due to 
these advances gained much currency in both policy circles 
and media.1 
 
At the same time, the end of the cold war and the eventual 
repositioning of the United States as the remaining global 
superpower were also reasons cited for an erosion of geogra-
phy in strategic thinking. The combination of open markets, 
trade liberalisation, and a downgrading of zero-sum stra-
tegic thinking on an international scale during that decade 
even led to talk about ‘virtual states’ which were more con-
cerned with developing economic strengths than obtaining 
land. Although there were some residual conflicts over terri-
tory, such as the 1990s Croatian and Bosnian conflicts in the 
former Yugoslavia, these were largely exceptions rather than 
indicators.2 Competition over land along with geographic 
considerations of security, was not vanishing but was defi-
nitely becoming subordinate to the affairs of globalisation.
 
In the Arctic, however, the idea of a ‘flattening’ political-
economic system runs headlong into the stark reality of its 
distinct geography. While globalising forces have not left this 
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1 Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat: The Globalised World in the Twen-
ty-First Century (London and New York: Penguin Books, 2006). 
2 Richard Rosecrance, ‘The Rise of the Virtual State: Territory Becomes 
Passé,’ Foreign Affairs 75(4) (July/August 1996): 45-61.
region untouched, the limitations of the various strands of 
globalisation, including economic and technological, are 
also readily apparent. In a region dominated by small popu-
lations, separated by great distances and harsh climatic and 
geographical conditions despite current trends in climate 
change, the politics of interconnectivity become much more 
complicated, and are tempered with the realities of isolation 
and vulnerability. 
As a result of climate change and the erosion of ice in the 
region, the Arctic has been opened up to greater economic, 
and consequently, strategic activity. Improved access to 
energy supplies and raw materials in the region has raised 
the possibility of competition among Arctic and non-Arctic 
states for these resources. It can thus be argued that ‘the Arc-
tic’ can and should now be examined as a distinct region, 
and that the Arctic is becoming a ‘securitized’ region, but in 
a non-traditional fashion reflecting circumpolar geographic 
realities. 
How to Define Arctic Security?
There have been recent studies which suggest that as the 
Arctic becomes further globalised and more economically 
valuable, the region will become militarised. Much of this 
debate has focussed on Russia, which has been seeking to 
strengthen its land forces and naval presence in the Arctic in 
recent years. For example, an August 2015 study suggested 
that Moscow was seeking to build an ‘Ice Curtain’ in the 
region.3 However, the story does not end with Russia, as the 
United States and Canada have debated building a stronger 
military position in the Far North, and there was much dis-
cussion in the United States during a transit of the Aleutian 
3 ‘Heather A. Conley and Caroline Rohloff, ‘The New Ice Curtain: Russia’s 
Strategic Reach to the Arctic,’ Centre for Strategic and International Stud-
ies (CSIS), 27 August 2015, <http://csis.org/files/publication/150826_
Conley_NewIceCurtain_Web.pdf>.
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Islands by five Chinese People’s Liberation Army Naval ves-
sels in September 2015.4 Yet although hard power considera-
tions are starting to be viewed more commonly in the Arctic, 
it is important to place these concerns in context. The Arctic 
is not a typical region, and the security conditions there are 
also far from mainstream.
The impediments created by the geographic realities of the 
Arctic are a major factor in hard security thinking, as well as 
a more overt ‘spillover’ of non-Arctic security issues such as 
current US-Russia strategic differences in Eastern Europe. As 
a result, Arctic regional differences over security will likely 
manifest themselves via soft balance of power behaviour. 
This is normally defined as power balancing without a mili-
tary dimension, and usually undertaken through organisa-
tions and regimes. The geographic and demographic realities 
of the Arctic strongly discourage hard power balancing or 
militarisation, and while there are likely to be incidents of 
spillover of great power and other non-Arctic security con-
cerns into the Far North, indeed Ukraine is now acting as the 
‘Banquo’s ghost’ of the region, this is still a far cry from pre-
dicting a sharp rise in traditional military behaviour in the 
Arctic even if the now-delayed ‘Arctic boom’ does come about 
in some form in the future. 
The distinct structures of the Arctic demonstrate one of the 
main reasons for soft-balancing behaviour becoming the 
norm in regional foreign policy both among Arctic states and 
major powers seeking an Arctic identity, such as China, India 
and Japan. There is some scholarly debate as to whether great 
powers can extend their reach effectively across oceans, as 
such large bodies of water (or ice) can be an impediment 
to power projection even today.5 In the case of the Arctic, 
countries large and small have taken a much more develop-
ment and economics-focused stance in developing regional 
relations, and there is also a strong degree of peer pressure 
placed on Arctic states to discourage revisionist or obstruc-
tionist behaviour. 
Even in the case of Russia, there has been a measured 
approach to the country’s security policies in the north, 
with military developments limited to acknowledged Rus-
sian waters. The ongoing diplomatic wrangling over the 
status of the Lomonosov ridge will be difficult to resolve, but 
signs suggest the debate will be restricted to the negotiating 
tables.6 There have been steps taken by Moscow to reopen 
military bases in Siberia and in the Russian Far East and to 
further add to its already impressive icebreaker fleet. Yet, 
there needs to be a greater examination of whether those 
actions can be classified as offensive or defensive in nature, 
or even ‘swaggering’, a term used to describe a display of 
military materiel for prestige purposes as opposed to a direct 
strategic aim.7 
 
There is a similar situation with non-Arctic states seeking to 
augment their presence in the Far North, as there is great sen-
sitivity towards ‘gate crashing’ among some Arctic govern-
ments, especially those of Canada and Russia, which have 
been particularly wary regarding their polar sovereignty. 
This has been especially the case with China, which joined 
the Arctic Council as an observer in 2013 and is the largest 
of the non-Arctic states to have developed a distinct set of 
Arctic policies. China’s rising power has meant that its Arctic 
strategies have been under consistent scrutiny as compared 
to those of other observers.8 Yet, Beijing has also taken great 
pains to frame its Arctic interests as being defined by scien-
tific and economic areas as opposed to hard security con-
cerns. Overall, as great powers, Arctic and non-Arctic, begin 
to brush up against each other in the region, the diplomatic 
norm has been dominated by policies more consistent either 
with harmony or with ‘soft balancing’ activities, rather than 
the first stages of zero-sum, hard power strategies. 
Regionalism Studies: Where Does the Arctic Fit?
Regions, including the Arctic, are often studied using vari-
ations of three approaches.9 The first and most visible is a 
‘materialist’ method, which looks at hard geography, includ-
ing the benefits of land versus sea power, and the potential 
benefits a given state may gain from its location. There have 
been many debates dating as far back as the nineteenth 
century over whether states, and especially great powers, 
benefit more from access to land or sea, (or some combina-
tion thereof), and during the scramble for overseas colonies 
among European great powers there was a strong tendency 
to examine regions in terms of their strategic value. Using a 
materialist approach to the study of regionalism in the Arctic 
is very straightforward. Although there are some differences 
between Arctic states as to where the boundaries of the 
region are, there is a general consensus as to the main actors 
and issues. 
The second approach, employing ‘ideational’ methods, places 
more focus on the role of politics and markets in shaping the 
perceptions of regions and their behaviour. While regions are 
often created by political cooperation or rivalry, witness the 
coalescing of Western and Eastern Europe during much of the 
cold war, trade can also create regional identities. The Euro-
pean Union could be considered one of the strongest exam-
ples of a region being created and shaped through political 
and economic means. Although geography is not ignored 
in these sorts of approaches, state behaviour is seen as the 
major determinant as to the exact definition of a region. 
4 Jeremy Page and Gordon Lubold, ’Chinese Navy Ships Came Within 12 
Nautical Miles of U.S. Coast,’ Wall Street Journal, 4 September 2015. 
5 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York, W.W. 
Norton, 2001), 41. 
6 Roland Oliphant, ‘Russia Claims Resource-Rich Swathe of Arctic Territory,’ 
The Telegraph, 4 August 2015. 
7 Robert J. Art, ’To What Ends Military Power?’ International Security 4 
(Spring 1980): 4-35. 
8 Marc Lanteigne, ’The Role of China in Emerging Arctic Security Discours-
es,’ Sicherheit und Frieden / Security and Peace 3(2015): 150-5. 
 9 Peter J. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American 
Imperium (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005), 6-12. 
34 · 2016
The creation of the Arctic Council and the development of 
Track II organisations have contributed much to the political 
regionalisation of the Arctic, but the growing global interest 
in the region has also forced the question of which non-
Arctic states can also make claims to an Arctic identity, and 
a degree of participation in Arctic affairs. Among the current 
roster of state observers in the Arctic Council, some observers 
such as France, Germany and Italy have longstanding Arctic 
histories. An Arctic White Paper released by the government 
of Italy in December 2015 was especially noteworthy in its 
use of historical background as a platform for the country’s 
emerging circumpolar policies.10 Other observers, such as 
China, Japan and Singapore, have focussed on their exten-
sive scientific and economic contributions to the Arctic. 
Japan’s Arctic White Paper released in October 2015 and Bei-
jing’s ‘six-point plan’ for the development of Chinese Arctic 
affairs illustrate this method.11 The question of the Arctic as 
a political region has not been completely solved however, 
as evidenced by the queue of new potential observer nations 
awaiting the 2017 Arctic Council Ministerial. 
The third approach, connected to the second but less rigid 
in scope, is a behavioural method whereby regions are 
studied as constantly being shaped and defined in terms of 
their structure and their identities, through day-to-day poli-
tics. To return to the European case, for example, for much 
of the twentieth century, the cold war distinction between 
Eastern and Western Europe was largely fixed and politically 
constructed. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the defini-
tion of the two ‘Europes’ changed dramatically, with the 
perceived border of ‘Eastern’ Europe pushed eastward into 
former Soviet lands, and the concept of a ‘Central Europe’ 
was added. When considering major regions of the world, 
the arguments over how best to describe ‘Europe’, ‘Asia’ and 
other regions are far from settled, either politically or eco-
nomically. 
The Arctic is facing the same questions, especially since the 
region has moved from relative global obscurity to high vis-
ibility since the 1990s, with many actors and several levels 
of analysis, including indigenous populations, local govern-
ments, state governments and regional regimes all contrib-
uting to the definition of the Arctic under globalisation. In 
2013, the Arctic was being framed as an Eldorado, promis-
ing great riches and resources. With the Arctic boom over or 
at least delayed with the fall of fossil fuel and commodity 
prices, the focus has largely shifted back to climate change 
and development issues.
The Arctic as a ‘Regional Security Complex’?
Just as it is important not to overstate the role of hard security 
in current Arctic affairs, it would also be a mistake to define 
the Arctic via ‘asecurity’ or a lack of security concerns alto-
gether.12 The opening of the Arctic, through various avenues 
such as economics, resources and climate change has meant 
that the region will become securitised in various forms. The 
questions which follow involve the responses to Arctic and 
non-Arctic states to these developments.
It is useful to examine these questions using the model of 
‘regional security complexes’ or RSCs, described as ‘a set of 
units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisa-
tion, or both are so interlinked that their security problems 
cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one 
another.’13 The ‘units’ involved are commonly states, but not 
always so, given the rise of multilateral organisations and 
other non-state actors in the international system. Among 
the RSCs which are commonly studied are the European, East 
Asian and Middle Eastern, with the argument that security 
concerns among the states which make up these regions have 
reached such a level of homogeneity that it is an effective 
practice to examine these concerns on a regional in addition 
to a state level. There are also states which lie between RSCs 
and are therefore studied as ‘insulators’ because they stand 
between larger security complexes and often face pressure 
from them. Examples of current insulator states are Afghani-
stan, Mongolia and Turkey. 
As the original studies of RSCs by Buzan and Wæver argue, 
RSCs are rarely static and can often be altered due to political 
decisions and manipulation. For example, there was a signifi-
cant shift in RSC boundaries and buffer zones, particularly in 
the developing world, after the cold war ended. The bounda-
ries between RSCs can be porous, with security concerns in 
one area spilling over into others. For example, in the case 
of Asia, the authors suggested different RSCs for East, South 
and Southeast Asia, but also added that all regions’ security 
concerns were becoming intertwined to the point where an 
Asian ‘supercomplex’ might be created which would incor-
porate these three RSCs plus Australia, with China and Japan 
acting as the main powers and policy shapers.14  
However, the RSC concept as it relates to the Arctic is more 
difficult to translate, first and foremost because the original 
work does not extend the demarcation of these regional 
complexes into the Arctic region. The Arctic Ocean is not 
commonly incorporated into the proposed global network 
10 Marc Lanteigne, ‘Italy’s Arctic Diplomacy: Past as Prologue,’ Arctic Journal, 
6 January 2016, <http://arcticjournal.com/opinion/2069/past-prologue>.
11 ‘Japan’s Arctic Policy (provisional English Translation),’ Arctic Portal, 21 
October 2015, <http://library.arcticportal.org/1883/>; ‘Keynote Speech 
by Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Ming at the China Country Session of the 
Third Arctic Circle Assembly,’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s 
Republic of China, 17 October 2015, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/
wjbxw/t1306858.shtml>.
12 On ‘insecurity vs. ‘asecurity’, see Bahar Rumelili, ‘Identity and Desecuriti-
sation: The Pitfalls of Conflating Ontological and Physical Security,’ Jour-
nal of International Relations and Development 18(January 2015): 52-74. 
13 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of Inter-
national Security (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 44. 
14 Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, 93-100; Barry Buzan, ‘Security 
Architecture in Asia: The Interplay of Regional and Global Levels,’ Pacific 
Review 16(2) (2003): 143-73. 
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of security complexes. Instead, the large space between the 
North American, European and Post-Soviet RSCs in the cir-
cumpolar north is blank, essentially a form of terra nullius 
(mare nullius? glacies nullius?) rather than a security com-
plex. In the original Buzan and Wæver study, Greenland was 
given the dubious distinction of being an insulator state as it 
stood between the North American and European RSCs. It is 
debatable how much pressure Greenland is facing from these 
two complexes, but should the island develop as a resource 
power in the future as the result of ice erosion, that situation 
may change considerably. 
Climate change in the Far North has opened up the question 
of whether the Arctic at this point in time should be consid-
ered ‘securitised’ and if so whether it could be considered an 
RSC of its own. Buzan and Wæver briefly address this ques-
tion by suggesting that, in rare cases, RSCs do not coalesce 
because the units involved are too weak and more preoccu-
pied with domestic affairs than regional ones, and the Arctic 
may be one of those rare cases of a ‘null set’, a place where 
the conditions for a security complex to develop are simply 
not present.15 
 
Yet, although the political and economic linkages in the cen-
tral Pacific are certainly not as strong as in other parts of the 
world, again due to geography, to say that no RSC exists at 
all is now arguable. As the Arctic becomes more connected 
in a variety of ways, there are several factors, starting with 
the effects of ice erosion and climate change, which are unit-
ing Arctic communities despite distance and geography, and 
these include economic security such as resource develop-
ment and shipping, as well as human security such as the 
safety of persons living and working in the region, but also 
the larger area of development security including the poten-
tial effects of environmental change on the region, including 
disruption to traditional livelihoods and even potentially 
environment-based migrations. 
Secondly, even assuming that the Arctic is currently a null set 
in terms of being a distinct securitised region, the changed 
security conditions in the Arctic, including issues related to 
non-traditional security concerns regarding the environment, 
development, climate and human security or security on the 
individual level are evolving to the point where even if there 
is no immediate ‘scramble for the Arctic’ or a Great Game / 
(Northern Edition), there will be a security complex created 
in short order as a result of internal and external political 
forces. The composition of the Arctic RSC will be quite differ-
ent from others which exist, but the ongoing convergence of 
strategic concerns suggests that an Arctic regional security 
complex’s development is a matter of when, not if. Future 
Arctic studies should therefore be prepared to better take 
into account this new level of analysis.
15 Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, 64. 
